Operation Economic Outcast Targets Global Maritime Fraud Network Supporting Iranian Regime

Network Circumvented Maritime Law to Enable Iran’s Shadow Fleet

WASHINGTON—Today, as part of Operation Economic Outcast, the U.S. Department of the Treasury targeted the vast criminal network of India-based Suniel Kumar Sharma and his spouse, Jaspreet Preeti Shahid, who have supported Iran’s shadow fleet through a web maritime fraud. Their schemes have provided false flags and certifications to sanctioned vessels involved in transporting Iranian petroleum, including vessels operating on behalf of the Iranian military and its proxies.

“As we have said many times, under Operation Economic Outcast, you are either with us or against us,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “We know where you are, and we will sanction those who continue supporting the Iranian regime, whether by land, sea, or air.”

False flags and fake maritime certifications allow vessels engaging in illicit activity to evade international regulations aimed at ensuring crew safety and safeguarding against environmental harm. Falsely flagged vessels carry no valid protection and indemnity insurance, meaning that Iranian shadow fleet vessels operating under false flags could potentially cause billions of dollars in damages to the economies of the countries in whose territorial waters they operate.

OFAC today also sanctioned Türkiye-based Fugo Ground Services Inc for its ongoing services in support of Iran’s aviation sector. Treasury has repeatedly warned that it will take action against those who continue to support Iran’s aviation industry, a key enabler of the regime’s destabilizing proliferation and terrorist activity.

Concurrently with these designations, OFAC is issuing a new alert to industry to warn of the sanctions risks of dealing with potentially falsely flagged vessels, reemphasizing previous warnings from Treasury to the maritime industry to screen against unscrupulous actors such as Sharma and the vessels his network supports. OFAC’s action also follows through on Treasury’s previous warning that any foreign firm or individual enabling sanctioned Iranian airlines—including through aircraft transfers, cargo services, or general sales agent support—will face serious consequences for supporting the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. The designations imposed today are being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets the Iranian petroleum, petrochemical, and aviation sectors, among other key sectors of the Iranian economy.

OPERATION ECONOMIC OUTCAST IS ISOLATING THE IRANIAN REGIME

Announced by Secretary Bessent on August 24, 2026 and dubbed Economic D-Day, Operation Economic Outcast is severing the remaining economic lifelines that sustain the Iranian regime. Treasury has mapped the networks, facilitators, and financial channels that Iran uses to smuggle oil, evade sanctions, and fund terror. Working with partners across the U.S. government, the European Union, United Kingdom, Gulf partners, and others, Treasury is targeting any source of the regime’s illicit revenue, as well as its sanctions evasion schemes to move funds.

Operation Economic Outcast significantly expanded sanctions risk for those who continue to choose to do business with Iran. Treasury warned that any entity facilitating money laundering or sanctions evasion on behalf of Iran risks being cut off from the U.S. financial system. Operation Economic Outcast also expanded sanctions exposure for non-U.S. persons who continue doing business with the Iranian regime and will accelerate the pace of U.S. enforcement. More information on Operation Economic Outcast is available here.

SHARMA CRIMINAL NETWORK

For years, Suniel Kumar Sharma (Sharma) and his wife, Jaspreet Preeti Shahid (Shahid), have, through their base in Chandigarh, India, defrauded maritime regulatory administrations in multiple jurisdictions in order to establish false flagging authorities and maritime classification societies. Purporting to represent nations from nearly every continent, from Guyana to Eswatini and Laos, Sharma and Shahid have allowed the Iranian shadow fleet, including those operating on behalf of the Iranian military and its proxies, to evade international restrictions on their operation.

Sharma and Shahid’s operations began as early as 2014, when the couple sought to impersonate the flagging authority of the Caribbean nation of Dominica. In 2023, Sharma established the Singapore-based Eswatini Maritime Affairs and International Ship Registry PTE. Ltd. (Eswatini Maritime), which, despite being publicly disavowed by Eswatini authorities, continues to provide flagging services for vessels transporting Iranian petroleum, including the sanctioned vessel PING SHUN (IMO 9231901), which at the time of its sanctioning had engaged in multiple shipments of Iranian oil.

Many of Sharma and Shahid’s false flagging registries are not tied to registered companies, however. In each case, the Sharma network purchases web domains, creating websites that claim to offer a variety of services on behalf of a country that has not authorized it to provide any of those services. The services often include flagging, seafarer training and certification, and vessel classification, all of which are traditionally handled by legitimate organizations that hold vessels to strict international standards.

Sharma’s network can be tied to multiple active websites that purport to belong to legitimate flagging registries. Among these false representations are websites purporting to provide flagging services on behalf of Aruba, Guyana, Mali, Mozambique, Malawi, Sint Maarten, and Timor-Leste, among others. Sanctioned shadow fleet vessels have since gravitated towards these registries despite widespread awareness that they are not endorsed by the relevant governments. For example, on April 22, 2026, the U.S. Department of War seized the false Guyana-flagged MAJESTIC X, formerly known as the PHONIX (IMO 9198317), which was carrying Iranian oil at the time of its boarding.

Sharma and Shahid additionally manage a network of primarily India-based entities, some of which are used to establish fraudulent flagging registries. Sharma is the managing director of India-based Oceaniek Technologies India, a company he has used to establish duplicitous flag registries, including those purporting to belong to Aruba, Nicaragua, and Sint Maarten. Through these fraudulent registries Sharma has provided false flags to numerous sanctioned vessels that transport Iranian petroleum products, including LATTAFA (IMO 9245794), BINARY STAR (IMO 9380570), and VERA (IMO 9304655).

As Sharma’s activities have garnered greater attention, Shahid has stepped in to manage—at least on paper—the pair’s business empire, which includes companies ranging from financial services businesses to media streaming platforms. Following press coverage of his activities, Sharma has closed down multiple deceitful registries, including the Laos Ship Registry and Maritime Safety Administration, previously known as the International Maritime Safety Agency of Guyana, a company that served as a false flagging agency for Guyana and was likely intended to similarly impersonate the Laotian government.

In addition to Shahid, Indian nationals Ashwani Kumar Dhiman and Ishwinder Singh nominally serve as directors of Sharma’s businesses, including India-based Aryavart Ship Management Private Limited.

Suniel Kumar Sharma is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. Jaspreet Preeti Shahid is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Suniel Kumar Sharma.

Eswatini Maritime Affairs and International Ship Registry PTE. Ltd. is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Jaspreet Preeti Shahid.

Oceaniek Technologies India is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Suniel Kumar Sharma.

Aryavart Ship Management Private Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Jaspreet Preeti Shahid. Ashwani Kumar Dhiman and Ishwinder Singh are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Aryavart Ship Management Private Limited.

In addition, the following India-based companies are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Jaspreet Preeti Shahid:

Precept Trends Private Limited;
Polynesia Maritime Private Limited;
Alexarya Finserv Private Limited;
Alexarya Media and Entertainment Private Limited;
Viharaboating Private Limited; and
Aryavart Maritime and Educational Trust.

GROUND HANDLING COMPANY SUPPORTING IRANIAN AIRLINES

On August 24, 2026, Treasury issued determinations pursuant to E.O. 13902 against critical sectors––including aviation––that the Iranian regime uses to try to prop up its economy. As Treasury has repeatedly highlighted, Iran uses its supposed “commercial” airlines, many of which are controlled by the regime and its military, to ferry fighters, ship weapons and sensitive technologies, and move gold and cash to its proxies. Today, OFAC is taking action against a Türkiye-based ground handling company that continues to service sanctioned Iranian airlines, despite Treasury’s warnings of the sanctions risks associated with supporting Iran’s aviation sector.

Türkiye-based Fugo Ground Services Inc provides ground handling and other services to several U.S.-designated Iranian airlines that continue to fly to Türkiye. Fugo Ground Services Inc has direct service agreements with U.S.-sanctioned Iranian carriers including Iran Air Tour, Saha Airlines, Sepehran Airlines, Varesh Airlines, Taban Airlines, and Ata Airlines Company, and began providing services to several of these carriers in the weeks after their September 8, 2026 designations.

OFAC is designating Fugo Ground Services Inc pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the aviation sector of the Iranian economy.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions, unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades or conspires to violate U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. Financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons, including the persons designated today. This includes, in addition to blocking prohibitions, that OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List, when consistent with relevant statutes and other authorities. The ultimate goal of sanctions is to bring about a positive change in behavior. What constitutes a sufficient change in circumstance will vary based on context, including the status of the broader geopolitical circumstances affecting the national security and foreign policy interests implicated by the declared national emergency. In the case of sanctions related to Iran, OFAC is employing all available statutory, regulatory, and policy tools to resolve the persistent national emergencies posed by Iran, which has not changed its behavior to align with U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. OFAC sanctions determinations, including removal determinations, are made consistent with Administration foreign policy and national security policies and priorities. For more information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on How to Request Removal from an OFAC List.

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